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Despite their unprecedented growth, developing countries still face severe problems in the provision of 
collective goods. Electricity, whose provision is scarce or unreliable in most developing regions, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, is an emblematic case. The reason for this shortage is not only 
imputable to the lack of effective formal institutions, but also to the inefficacy of informal institutions in 
enabling alternative solutions for the production, transmission and distribution of electricity. We claim 
that in this context of “double institutional void”, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) can play a decisive role. However, their effectiveness depends on both the formal 
and informal institutional proximity between the home and the host countries. Our empirical analysis 
relies on panel data models run on a sample of pairs of home-host countries, the latter of which are all 
from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), observed from 2005 to 2011. 
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The impact of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and foreign direct investments (FDI) on host countries, 
especially developing countries, has been widely debated and generated substantial controversy (e.g., 
Kolk et al., 2018; Oetzel and Doh, 2009). On the one hand, MNEs and FDI promote economic growth 
by raising domestic savings, transferring technology and knowledge, increasing domestic competition 
and stimulating entrepreneurship (Caves, 1974; Teece, 1977); on the other hand, they may crowd out 
local firms, introduce inappropriate technologies, constrain potential technology and knowledge 
spillovers, and reduce domestic tax revenues because of transfer price and profit manipulation (De 
Backer and Sleuwagen, 2003; Haddad and Harrison, 1993). Such a controversy about the impact of 
MNEs is not limited to economic performance, as it also  covers  non-economic dimensions of 
development, such as environmental and social issues (Abdouli and Hammami, 2017; Hubler and Keller, 
2010).  
We aim to join this debate by investigating the role that FDI might play in promoting a specific dimension 
of development, namely, the access to electricity of a local population (see also, D’Amelio et al., 2016; 
Sesan et al., 2013). In fact, access to modern energy services, particularly electricity, together with other 
commodities, functions and services, such as drinkable water, education, transportation, communication, 
and health, is a collective good1, and its provision is necessary to enhance standards of living, to run 
business activities, and to the functioning of public services (e.g., Kebede, Kagochi, and Jolly, 2010; 
Khavul and Bruton, 2013; Ahlborg et al., 2015). However, the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
estimates that 1.3 billion people in developing countries, which is equivalent to 17 per cent of the global 
population, had not access to electricity in 2013. Nearly 97 per cent of those people live in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) and developing Asia (IEA, 2014). For this reason, in 2011, the United Nations General 
Secretary launched the Sustainable Energy for All Initiative (SE4All) with one of its objectives being the 
universal access to electricity by 2030. 
A few structural characteristics of developing countries, coupled with low income, trigger a vicious circle 
between energy poverty and development slowdown (see Sovacool, 2012, for a review of energy poverty 
effects and structural causes). For-profit electric utilities tend not to deploy the electricity infrastructure 
                                                          
1 We name access to energy “collective good”, because we refer to the definition of collective goods used by Boddewyn and 
Doh (2011), i.e. ” those commodities, functions, and services that provide positive externalities such as health, education, 
communication, transportation, water, and electricity to local collectivities”. More in detail, communities that obtain access 
to modern energy services can provide their members with public goods such as street lighting, enhanced safety or education. 
However, while energy generates important externalities, a significant part of its benefits such as cooking, indoor lighting, 
heating are affected by so-called “rivalry”; thus, it is an impure public good, or a collective good in the words of Boddewyn 




when the potential customers have a low income, and when investment and operation costs are high due 
to the geographic dispersion of population, the presence of rural areas, and/or topographical challenges 
for connectivity. However, public sector players are unlikely to be the solution in these countries, because 
they are financially constrained and tend to privilege other urgent needs or to focus on urban areas. In 
turn, without access to modern forms of energy, households miss opportunities for income-generation 
activities, spend an important part of their time or financial budget in supplying the fuel, are not able to 
study at home, and suffer health problems owing to the use of traditional biomasses. In other words, 
population slides away even more from the development path, and the willingness to pay for electricity 
further decreases, a fact that jeopardizes the incentives to provide access to electricity.2  
In order to assess whether inward FDI may play a role in breaking the vicious circle that keep developing 
countries in energy poverty conditions, we build a model for the determinants of electricity access. 
Specifically, we adopt a conceptual framework that relies on two research traditions, namely the 
transaction cost economics (TCE) of infrastructure provision (Ostrom et al., 1993; Levy and Spiller, 
1994; Henisz and Zelner, 2001; Henisz, 2002; Spiller, 2013), and the institutional theory of 
organizations3 (for a recent literature review with specific reference to emerging countries, see Rottig, 
2016). While TCE studies have highlighted that well-functioning formal and informal institutions are 
necessary to remedy market and governmental failures in the infrastructure sectors, institutional theorists 
have emphasized that the social environment and its formal and informal “rules of the game” affect an 
organization’s structure and actions. Specifically, formal institutions refer to rules that are observable 
through written documents, or rules that are determined and executed through formal positions, such as 
authority or ownership; they include juridical rules, explicit incentives, contractual terms and economic 
                                                          
2 The last half of the twentieth century has witnessed a further slowdown in infrastructure investments and maintenance for 
the production, transmission and distribution of electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Robbins and Perkins, 2012). Although the 
reasons for this decline are complex and vary across countries, the decrease of state revenues stemming from the commodity 
price crisis of the 1970s, and the consequent political and economic instability are likely to have reduced the diffusion of 
modern forms of electricity.   
3 We are aware that the societal role of MNEs can be studied adopting different theoretical lens (see Forsgren, 2017). However, 
echoing Forsgren (pp. 144), “the (institutionalization) theory is quite mixed from a societal point of view. One strand within 
the theory emphasizes the/a multinational firm’s tendency to adapt to external institutions in terms of rules, norms and values. 
In that sense, it has a quite passive or reactive role. But […] other themes in the theory emphasize that multinational firms 
can have a much more proactive role vis-à-vis society. These themes leave room for the idea that powerful multinationals can 
shape the environment in such a way that they maximize their own short-term profits instead of being beneficial for society 
in the long- run. The outcome hinges on the power balance between the multinational firm and the surrounding society.” Thus, 
as we are dealing with the role of institutions on the one hand, and the MNEs’ search for legitimacy through market and non-
market strategies, on the other, we believe our context is particularly appropriate to understand the “balance between the 
multinational firm and the surrounding society”. We are particularly grateful to an anonymous Referee who stimulated us to 





rules/property rights (North, 1990). Informal institutions are non-codified systems of shared values and 
collective understanding, which shape cohesion and coordination among individuals in a society (Holmes 
et al., 2013; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Electricity shortage could stem from the failure of formal institutions to ensure that governments provide 
electricity infrastructures or regulate private utilities (Gillanders, 2014; Henisz, 2002; Levy and Spiller, 
1994); however, electricity shortage could also derive from the inability of informal institutions to 
promote self-organized collective actions, i.e. cooperatives and non-profit organizations (NGOs), which 
develop and operate decentralized systems for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity 
(Hansmann, 1996; Ostrom et al., 1993; Teegen, 2003). We argue that, within this context, and 
particularly when both formal and informal institutions fail to develop lasting solutions for the provision 
of electricity to the local population, inward FDI and foreign MNEs may actively participate in the 
development, maintenance and operation of an electricity infrastructure, alone or in partnership with for-
profit local organizations or NGOs (Boddewyn and Doh, 2011).  
Foreign MNEs engage in electricity provision following both market and non-market strategies. As far 
as market strategies, first, electricity provision is the core mission of foreign utilities that enter liberalized 
local markets by leveraging resources and competences that have cumulated in their home countries and 
on international markets (Mbalyohere et al., 2017). Second, MNEs, especially from energy-intensive 
industries (like those in the mining industries, e.g. Banerjee et al. 2014, pp. 43-55) have traditionally 
invested in generation and transmission infrastructures to grant a reliable and cost-effective supply for 
their own operations. In fact, some of them are abandoning the traditional “enclave” approach and do 
cooperate with local governments to provide electricity infrastructures that serve both their operations 
and local users (Robbins and Perkins, 2012; Toledano, 2012; Banerjee et al. 2014, pp. 57-80). 
Additionally, the activism of MNEs in electricity provision could reflect a non-market strategy, since 
promoting the local population’s access to electricity is a means through which MNEs gain legitimacy 
with local stakeholders, thus raising the likelihood of success in their own core businesses (Holburn and 
Zelner, 2010).  
However, we also claim that to properly assess the impact of MNEs in foreign countries, it is important 
to take into account the institutional environment of their country of origin and, specifically, the 
institutional proximity with the host country. In fact, managers’ competences depend on their specific 
formal and informal institutional setting (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999); thus, we expect that those MNEs 
that are more effective in developing electricity infrastructure and raising access to electricity will be 




In this paper, we focus on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), as this is one of the regions in the world that, 
according to UNCTAD data, has experienced the greatest increase in the flows of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) over the last decade, namely a 120 per cent increase from 2005 to 2014. In fact, a stable 
economic growth, a burgeoning middle class, an increasing purchasing power and a youthful population 
has led Ernest and Young to rank SSA as the second most attractive region in the world in 2014 (E&Y, 
2014). Nevertheless, the same region, with 68 per cent of the population (i.e., 634 million people) without 
access to electricity, has the lowest access to electricity rate in the world (IEA, 2014). In this context, 
investigating whether FDI and MNEs can play a role in stimulating the long-term development of the 
region seems to be particularly appropriate. 
In order to test the impact of inward FDI and MNEs on the access to electricity, and the contingencies 
related to the quality of the host and home countries’ institutions, and their proximity, we adopt the so 
called infrastructure deployment model introduced by Henisz and Zelner (2001) to study the institutional 
determinants of telecommunication infrastructures. Our findings, obtained by means of panel data 
techniques, confirm that FDI can raise the access to electricity of a local population, depending on the 
quality of formal and informal institutions in both the country of origin and the country of destination of 
the investment. Specifically, we find that FDI positively impact the access to electricity of the local 
population especially in those countries where both formal and informal institutions are weak. 
Additionally, this is more likely to be the case when FDI come from countries that are institutionally 
closer to the host country.  
We believe our results contribute to the debate on the impact of MNEs on developing countries and the 
role of (formal and informal) institutions therein, by focusing on an important prerequisite for 
development – namely, the provision of electricity.  
This article is organized as follows. Our conceptual framework is presented in section 2. Section 3 
illustrates the data and the variables employed in our empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the model 
adopted to test our hypotheses. Sections 5 and 6 present the results and robustness checks, respectively. 
Finally, section 7 concludes and discusses some policy and managerial implications of our results. 
 
2. The role of institutions, FDI and MNEs in the provision of electricity. A conceptual framework 
The provision of infrastructures and other collective goods has been widely investigated through 
conceptual frameworks that combine TCE with a thorough analysis of institutions across different 
geographic contexts (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1993; Levy and Spiller, 1994; Henisz and Zelner, 2001; Henisz, 




Infrastructure assets are highly specific and not re-deployable; they enjoy important economies of scale 
and scope, and have a broad range of domestic users (Levy and Spiller, 1994). The combination of these 
features generates transaction costs and makes infrastructures highly vulnerable to expropriation risks, 
unless the hold-up problem is alleviated through appropriate formal institutions (Levy and Spiller, 1994; 
Henisz, 2002). If formal institutions are well-designed and protected, the State provides and/or regulates 
electricity infrastructures. However, another body of TCE studies emphasize that centralized institutional 
arrangements are unlikely to efficiently coordinate the multiple independent actions that are necessary to 
develop, maintain and operate infrastructures (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 38-39), partly because they rarely adapt 
to specific local circumstances and needs (Ostrom et al., 1993, pp. 141-156).  More generally, in 
developing countries, the functioning of formal institutions can suffer to various degrees when the 
judicial system is inefficient, regulation is misguided and information is not reliable, thus generating 
formal institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). When this is the case, national governments are 
likely to be ineffective in providing and/or regulating electricity infrastructures.  
In such a context of formal institutional voids, informal institutions can play a crucial role in supporting 
the provision of collective goods (Teegen, 2003). In fact, informal institutions may be seen as enabling 
conditions and they have become crucial for the economic activity, especially in emerging and 
developing markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). In the electricity sector, in particular, informal 
institutions may enable self-organized collective actions, namely NGOs or electricity cooperatives, 
which are owned and managed by a group of consumers or by local communities, and often supplant 
State-owned and/or regulated utilities (Ostrom et al., 1993; Hansmann, 1996). 
Informal institutions emerge in response to repeatedly encountered social and/or economic problems, 
and they mirror the social capital of the country, meant as the “goodwill available to individuals or 
groups, whose source lies in the structure and content of the actor’s social relations” (Adler and Kwon, 
2002: 23). A higher social capital corresponds to stronger links among individuals and/or groups, thus 
lowering transaction costs, favoring cohesiveness, and facilitating the pursuit of collective goals 
(Sandefyr and Laumann, 1998). Thus, informal institutions are related to the social structure, namely the 
level of trust and collectivism among the individuals or groups that compose a society (Leana and Van 
Buren, 1999; London and Hart, 2004). Trust is a “generalized expectancy held by an individual that the 
word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon” (Rotter, 1980, 
p.1). In economic terms, trust is a mechanism that mitigates (against) the risk of opportunistic behavior 
among those engaged in various types of economic transactions (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). For this 




collectivism, defined as the willingness and ability of individuals to define collective goals that are 
enacted collectively, is essential for the generation of social capital (Leana and Van Buren 1999). 
This implies that collectivist and trust-based societies, where community members trust each other and 
act on the basis of group rationality rather than individual rationality, are more likely to self-organize and 
to be successful in the provision of collective goods (Holmes et al., 2013; Teegen, 2003). However, 
whether a common action can be effectively organized internally by communities, namely by citizens’ 
self-governed associations, is highly contingent to the social setting (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 55-57). As 
previously described for formal institutions, when informal institutions are poorly developed, the country 
experiences an informal institutional void. 
Thus, the provision of electricity in a country depends on the quality and strength of both formal and 
informal institutions. Table 1 illustrates the available arrangements to provide electricity under different 
combinations of formal and informal institutions. Specifically, infrastructures include national grids that 
connect large production nodes to regions and large consumption areas over long distances; mini grids 
that connect consumers belonging to smaller local communities to local production plants, and off-grid 
systems that ensure autonomy of the end-users (IEA, 2014; Banerjee et al. 2014, pp. 43-55). National 
grids cannot be deployed and managed by decentralized local players, such as NGOs and cooperatives. 
However, those organizations that engage local consumers and other local players have an advantage in 
adapting mini and off-grid systems to local needs and circumstances.  
In situations in which both formal and informal institutions are strong (North-West cell in Table 1), both 
State-owned or regulated utilities and NGOs or cooperatives can develop and operate electricity 
infrastructures of different kinds. The North-East and South-West cells in Table 1 represent situations in 
which strong formal institutions balance weak informal institutions and vice versa. Strong formal 
institutions are sufficient to ensure that State-owned or regulated utilities provide electricity, mainly 
through national or mini grids. On the other hand, stronger informal institutions promote the formation 
of NGOs and cooperatives that mainly supply electricity through off- and mini-grid systems. Finally, in 
a context of double institutional void (South-East cell in Table 1), arrangements such as State ownership, 
regulation, NGOs or cooperatives are unlikely to be effective, and foreign MNEs can emerge as important 
actors in the provision of electricity.  
 





Other studies (e.g., D’Amelio et al., 2016) have already shown that when formal institutions are weak, 
MNEs actively participate in the development of infrastructures for the provision of electricity to the 
local population. We claim that this is even more the case when the informal institutions are also weak, 
that is, where no other body is in place to provide electricity to the local market.  
In fact, the engagement of foreign MNEs with electricity infrastructure may be associated to the 
company’s market or non-market strategies  (Doh et al., 2012). On the one hand, as far as market 
strategies, MNEs may build electricity infrastructure as part of their core product/service (Mbalyohere et 
al., 2017). As acknowledged by Buckley and Boddewyin (2015), “such internalization of the markets for 
public goods and societal functions is often necessary for the production and distribution of the private 
goods, which attracted MNEs to these markets in the first place”. For example, the Electricité de France 
Group (EDF), a global leader in the power sector, signed several agreements with national governments 
and other MNEs to cooperate in the improvement of the electrification rate in several Sub-Saharan 
countries, such as Botswana, Mali, South Africa and Senegal. This has been done through the 
development of on-grid and mini-grid systems. In other industries, like manufacturing and mining, 
companies may engage in electricity infrastructures because they need energy to run their business 
activities and supply their products (Robbins and Perkins, 2012; Toledano, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2014). 
On the other hand, MNEs could supplement governmental and non-governmental activities in the 
provision of electricity infrastructures as part of their non-market strategies. Indeed, corporate social 
responsibility and corporate political activities may be instrumental to gain the legitimacy that is 
necessary to countervail the liabilities of being a foreign as well as a profit-driven company. By providing 
electricity to the local population, MNEs internalize societal failures (i.e. those associated to society’s 
non market subsystems – political, social and cultural – that are subject to failures just like economic 
markets, see Buckley and Boddewyn, 2015), and show commitment toward the country in which they 
are investing, thus gaining legitimacy with local stakeholders, e.g., civil society, politicians and local 
representatives (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). In fact, legitimatization with local stakeholders is 
fundamental to increase the chances of survival and success of foreign firms on the host market 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). An example is AngloGold Ashanti, a South African multinational mining 
company that operates in Guinea and which, as a result of villagers’ protests in 2012, built an electric 
power line from one of its mining plants to the nearby town, in order to gain legitimacy with the villagers 
and guarantee their business activities (Toledano, 2012). 




H1. The presence of FDI and MNEs is more likely to positively impact the access to electricity of the 
local population when both formal institutions and informal institutions of the host country are weak (i.e. 
the host country suffers from a double institutional void). 
 
However, institutional theory suggests that MNEs must conform to the rules and requirements of the 
local social environments in which they operate in order to be perceived as legitimate (Rosenzweig and 
Singh, 1991; Westney, 1993). In fact, organizations that do not conform to the rules, values and beliefs 
lose the support of, and acceptance by, the surrounding society in which they are embedded (Scott, 2014).  
Hence, unless MNEs understand and correctly interpret the formal regulatory and informal normative 
and cultural rules of a foreign institutional environment, they are unlikely to succeed on that market 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Scott, 2014). Information asymmetry is acute as it is difficult for a foreign 
firm to fully understand local practices; additionally, both external and internal uncertainty surrounding 
MNE investments is high because of the typical lack of stability in the host less developed countries 
(Buckley and Boddewyn, 2015). 
Accordingly, previous studies have already shown that the effectiveness of MNEs in compensating the 
inability of host country institutions to provide electricity is strongly influenced by the proximity between 
the formal institutional context of the country of origin of the MNE and the formal institutional 
environment of the host country (D’Amelio et al., 2016). When formal institutions of the host and the 
home country presents some similarities, MNE managers are likely to have already developed at home 
the capability to deal with weak formal institutions, the resilience against and the adaptability to the 
political turbulences and uncertainties in the region (Mbalyohere and Lawton, 2018), and are more 
effective in identifying key actors to form winning coalitions in the host country (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; De Beule et al., 2014).  
We argue that the same situation should in principle hold also when considering informal institutions of 
the host country, and their proximity with the relevant institutions between the host country and the 
MNEs’ home country. In fact, managers from countries with a low attitude toward collectivism and trust 
are familiar with the inability of local communities and NGOs to compensate for the weakness of national 
governments in implementing sound and lasting actions for the provision of electricity to local 
populations. For this reason, compared with MNEs from countries with strong informal institutions, 
MNEs from informal and institutionally weak countries are more likely to have already developed in-
house alternative solutions for the provision of electricity to the population of the countries where they 




unique institutional environments of the host developing countries (Rottig, 2016). Accordingly, our 
second hypothesis states as follows: 
 
H2. The presence of FDI and MNEs in a country affected by formal and informal (double) institutional 
void is more likely to positively impact the access to electricity of the local population when they come 
from countries that are institutionally closer to the host country. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample is composed of pairs of 73 home countries and 15 host countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which are observed from 2005 to 2011. Table 2 reports the list of sample host countries and host-home 
country pairs. 
In order to deal with missing data (especially for the variables that measure the access to electricity for 
local populations, and for data on inward FDI), we adopted multiple imputation techniques4 (Allison, 
2001), and this led to a final balanced sample of 1,547 observations. 
Given the nature of our data, we adopted an econometric analysis based on panel data techniques. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.2. Dependent Variable 
Access to Electricity Growth. The access to electricity rate has been sourced from the World Energy 
Outlook of the IEA. Namely, our dependent variable is the annual growth of the percentage of households 
with access to electricity (Source: IEA). According to the definition provided by IEA, access to electricity 
comprises consumption of a minimum level of electricity, set equal to 250 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per year 
for rural households, and to 500 kWh per year for urban households (IEA, 2014). This variable includes 
infrastructural and non-infrastructural solutions for the provision of electricity (e.g., diesel generators) 
and mainly refers to the supply side of electricity access. Thus, we also included control variables that 
                                                          
4 With multiple imputation, missing values are drawn from a distribution of observed variables, including the variables at 
stake. Multiple imputation does not entail interpolation from contiguous values. Instead, it is generated by chained equations, 
an option that is suitable to deal with a high proportion of missing data (Allison, 2001). Finally, in order to guarantee the 





capture the determinants of the electricity demand and obstacles to the development of electricity 
infrastructures (see below). 
Table 3 shows the data on the access to electricity from 2005 to 2011 in the host countries of our sample. 
Overall, the access to electricity increased in all Sub-Saharan countries, with peaks in Namibia (+26%), 
Angola and Ghana (both +23%). The countries with the highest rate of access to electricity in 2011 are 
Mauritius (99%) and South Africa (85%); the most problematic countries are the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (9%), Uganda (15%) and Kenya (19%).  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.3. Explanatory variables 
FDI per capita. Bilateral inward FDI stocks disaggregated according to the country of origin and the 
destination of the investment have been adopted to measure the presence of foreign MNEs (Source: 
UNCTAD). Since inward FDI stock is an extensive variable, which varies according to the country’s 
size, and our dependent variable is expressed as a percentage of population, we considered the bilateral 
FDI per capita5.  
Table 4 shows the distribution of the FDI per capita according to the region of origin. The European 
Union appears to be the main investor (28% of the total FDI per capita), followed by North America 
(19%), South-East Asia (15%) and SSA (11%). The Chinese FDI ranks sixth, with a total amount of $19k 
per capita (7% of the total FDI per capita)6. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
Formal Institutional Void. The formal institutional void in a host country is measured considering the 
six World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) on a yearly basis, namely regulatory 
quality, control of corruption, voice and accountability, rule of law, governance effectiveness and 
political stability, and absence of violence and terrorism. We have chosen these indicators as they are 
                                                          
5 We are aware that FDI stocks may often be a biased measure of MNE affiliate activity, for example when (as in tax haven 
countries) FDI do not generate actual productive activity. See Beugelsdijk et al. (2010) for an exhaustive discussion on this 
issue. 
6 A possible explanation for the small amount of Chinese FDI could be that Chinese companies rely heavily on government-
sponsored projects, and this makes the distinction between FDI and official assistance ambiguous. For instance, investments 
by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are included in the definition of official flows of development assistance if they 




good proxies for the institutional mechanisms that, according to Bergara et al. (1998), are necessary to 
guarantee the feasibility of infrastructure investment (for further details on the definition of the formal 
institutional dimensions, see Appendix A.1).  However, as there is not a univocal correspondence 
between the WGIs and these four mechanisms, all (the) six WGIs have been considered. In addition, due 
to the high correlation among these indicators (coefficient > 0.7 and p<0.01) and in line with the previous 
literature (e.g., Farla et al., 2016), we performed a factor analysis in order to have an indicator of the 
degree of formal institutional void of a host country, as shown in Table 5. This variable takes a high 
value when the country is affected by a severe formal institutional void, and a lower value for a higher 
quality of formal institutions. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Informal Institutional Void. As illustrated in Section 2, a country’s social capital is a major component 
of local informal institutions. Social capital is weaker where the degree of collectivism and trust are lower 
(or, conversely, when individualism and distrust are higher). In order to measure the void of informal 
institutions in the host country, we adopted the following two variables: (a) institutional collectivism, 
sourced from the Global Leadership and Organisational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) project, and 
(b) the degree of interpersonal trust, sourced from the World Value Survey (WVS).  
As far as institutional collectivism, it reflects “the degree to which organizational and societal 
institutional practices encourage and reward the collective distribution of resources and collective action” 
(House et al., 2004: 30). Thus, high institutional collectivism corresponds to strong informal institutions, 
i.e. to a low level of informal institutional voids, while low collectivism reveals high informal 
institutional voids. Note that the GLOBE dataset hosts a continuous country-level and time invariant 
indicator for institutional collectivism.  
Concerning the degree of interpersonal trust in a society, it explains why actors tend to cooperate in some 
settings but do not cooperate in other settings (Cox et al., 2009; Ostrom et al., 1993). A high level of 
interpersonal trust corresponds to small informal institutional voids, while low trust reveals high informal 
institutional voids. Specifically, the WVS dataset reports the country-level rate of respondents who agree 
that “Most people can be trusted” for the 2005-’09 period, with different years for different countries. In 
principle, trust and collectivism could exhibit some degree of longitudinal variance in the panel time 




institutions are endogenous to indigenous societies, a fact that makes them evolve slowly (Boettke et al., 
2008).  
Formal and Informal Institutional Proximity. In order to proxy institutional proximity between the host 
and the home country, we first calculated the formal and informal voids (i.e. the quality of the formal 
and informal institutions) for the home country (using the same procedures and sources presented above 
for the host country). We then measured the dyadic distance between the level of institutional void in the 
home and host countries by means of the Mahalanobis method7.  Finally, by inverting the measures of 
institutional distance, we obtained institutional proximity between the home and host country, both for 
formal and informal institutions8. 
 
3.4. Control Variables 
The statistical analysis includes a number of control variables. First, as the growth rate in the access to 
electricity is largely dependent on economic resources (Ahlborg et al., 2015), we introduced two 
dummies accounting for the income level of the host country, namely, low-income country (LIC) and 
lower middle-income country (LMIC). The upper middle-income country (UMIC) dummy represents 
the baseline. The classification comes from the World Bank9. 
In addition, in order to control for the host country’s economic structure and to mitigate the lack of 
information about  the sector of the inward FDI, we included industry and service value added variables, 
both of which are expressed as  percentages of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Source: World Bank’s 
Development Indicators). Specifically, industry value added covers mining, manufacturing, construction, 
electricity, water and gas, while service value added comprises wholesale and retail trade (including 
hotels and restaurants), transport, government, financial, professional and personal services, such as 
education, health care and real estate services. The two variables take on a low value if the country is 
specialized in agriculture, husbandry, forestry and fishing.   
Since, ceteris paribus, it is more difficult to increase access to electricity when a population lives in a 
rural area, we also included the variable Rural population, measured by the annual percentage of 
                                                          
7 It may be worth noting that the Mahalanobis method is generally considered a better choice than the more traditional 
Euclidean method, as it is scale invariant and it takes into consideration the variance–covariance matrix (Berry et al., 2010). 
8 We are aware that, given that nearly half of the FDI in SSA in the period considered come from the EU and North America, 
the concept of (formal and informal) institutional similarity is likely to assume a relative rather than an absolute nature. In 
other words, we could talk about greater or lower similarity, rather than similarity per se. We’d like to thank an anonymous 
reviewer for pointing out this important issue. 
9 It may be worth noting that the World Bank classification is built, on a yearly basis, using the nominal gross national income 




population living in a rural area, and Population density, measured by the number of people per square 
kilometer of land area. Both variables come from the World Bank’s Development Indicators.  
Furthermore, as electrification shows scale effects, we control for the size of the country (Population), 
expressed in millions of people (the source of data is the World Bank’s Development Indicators).  
Finally, in order to capture time varying macroeconomic shocks and unobservable country pair specific 
factors, we added time and country pair dummies. 
Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables considered. The overall 
pattern does not reveal any multi-collinearity. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4. Methodology 
In order to analyze the determinants of the access to electricity by local population, we adopt a growth 
model that links infrastructure deployment to institutions (see Henisz and Zelner, 2001). Equation (1) 
represents our baseline. 
(1)     ∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1                 
           + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +   
           + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖 + 
          + 𝛽4 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖,𝑡−1  
          + 𝛽5 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖 
           + 𝛾 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′  +  𝜑𝑡 + 𝜒𝑗𝑖 + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡                          
where i is the host country, j is the home country, t is the year, φt  and χji are  the unobservable year and 
country-pair fixed effects, respectively; εij,t is the i.i.d. disturbance term. ΔAccess to electricityi,t is the 
difference in the access to electricity rate between t and t-1 for host country i.  Access to electricityi,t.1 is 
the lagged dependent variable in level. Equation (1) is a reduced form specification of the dynamic 
investment model (see Bond and Van Reenen, 2007), since the growth of access rate is a proxy of 
investment, and the lagged access rate is a proxy of the installed capital stock. The equivalent model in 
which the dependent variable is the access rate in level can easily be obtained by adding the/a lagged 
dependent variable, i.e. Access to electricityi,t.1, to both sides of the equation  and re-parametrizing its 
coefficient into 1 +  𝛼1.   
The explanatory variables are FDI per capita i,j,t.1, Formal Institutional Voidi, and Informal Institutional 




specification to preserve the maximum possible number of degrees of freedom available for the estimates, 
but this specification choice does not imply that the response of access to electricity to FDI should take 
just one period. The presence of the lagged depend variable ensures that the response of access to 
electricity to FDI is not compelled to take just one period, it can take as many periods as necessary. While 
the  𝛽1  …  𝛽5 coefficients capture the short-run marginal effects of the FDI and institutions, the 𝛼1 
coefficient encompasses the long-run dynamics of the relationships between FDI, institutions and access 
to electricity (see also Garrone and Grilli, 2010). D’Amelio et al. (2016) simulate a similar dynamic 
model, and show that two or three years are the typical response time.  
Z’i,t-1 is the control vector  (population, rural population, population density, industry value added and 
service value added), lagged by one period, while D’i,t  is the vector of the LIC and LMIC dummies.  
Equation (1) was then extended by introducing formal institutional proximity and informal institutional 
proximity, both linearly and in interaction with FDI per capita, as shown in Equation (2).  
(2)     ∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1                 
           + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +   
           + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖 + 
          + 𝛽4 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖,𝑡−1  
          + 𝛽5 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖 
           + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +   
          + 𝛽7 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 
           + 𝛾 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
′  +  𝜑𝑡 + 𝜒𝑗𝑖 + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡  
According to the literature on dynamic panel data, we used the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
Generalized Method of Moments estimator (system GMM) (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). Specifically, we adopted a two-step method as it is asymptotically more efficient than the 
one-step method (Baltagi, 2005); the bias in the standard errors was fixed by means of Windmeijer’s 
(2005) correction procedure. We controlled for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, the 
country’s economic structure, the country’s income level, FDI per capita, and the level of formal and 
informal institutional voids of the host country. Furthermore, we added some external instruments treated 




internal ethnic and religious tensions, and other dimensions of economic development not included in 
the model, due to multi-collinearity problem10.  
Finally, it is worth observing that before computing our estimates, we ran a reverse causality analysis 
(using the baseline presented in Equation (1)) to rule out the possibility that the presence of electricity 
infrastructure has attracted FDI, and not the other way around. Results confirm that causality runs from 
inward FDI to access to electricity growth11. 
 
5. Results 
Table 7 reports our estimates. In Models (1), (2) and (3), informal institutional void has been measured 
by the degree of institutional individualism, while in Models (4), (5) and (6), informal institutional void 
has been measured by the degree of distrust. Models (1) and (4) represent the baseline, where we test the 
impact of FDI per capita on the access to electricity growth, contingent on the degree of formal and 
informal institutional voids in the host country.  We then add formal institutional proximity, both in level 
and in interaction with FDI per capita in Models (2) and (5), respectively. Likewise, we added informal 
institutional proximity, both in level and interacted with the FDI per capita, in Models (3) and (6). 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The lagged dependent variable in level is negative and significant in all the models, meaning that the 
higher the electrification rate at time t-1, the lower the growth rate of the access to electricity at time t.  
All the control variables show a steady and significant sign across all the models. Specifically, the country 
size (Population) and the population density contribute positively to the access to electricity growth, 
while a high rate of rural population curtails it (p<0.01). This confirms that an increase in the access to 
electricity rate mainly occurs through the development of an electricity infrastructure, which is 
characterized by economies of scale and density. The LIC dummy variable  is negative and significant 
(p<0.01), possibly because an important part of the economy of these countries is represented by the 
mining sector, which leads to limited benefits for the local population in terms of access to electricity 
                                                          
10 The level of a country’s globalization has been proxied with the KOF index of globalization introduced by Dreher (2006). 
The level of human capital has been measured by the human flight and brain drain variable (Source: Fund for Peace). The 
internal tensions have been represented by the group grievance variable (Source: Fund for Peace). Finally, economic 
development has been expressed by the poverty and economic decline variable that aggregates dimensions such as 
unemployment, youth unemployment, economic deficit, government depth, inflation, purchasing power and GDP growth 
(Source: Fund for Peace). 





(World Bank, 2015). In fact, a recent study of the World Bank on more than four hundred mining projects 
in the SSA has shown that mining companies often use their own generators or source electricity from 
the national grid, while only rarely they sell excess power to the grid or electrify the neighboring rural 
population (World Bank, 2015)12. For this reason, the negative effect is not that surprising. Finally, as 
expected, a higher level of service value added increases the growth of the access to the electricity rate, 
while industry value added is not significant. 
The estimates in Table 7 confirm that countries lacking effective institutions experience a slower growth 
in access to electricity (D’Amelio et al., 2016). However, the effect of individual institutional 
components seem to depend on the specifications adopted. In fact, we find that the direct effect of the 
degree of individualism on the growth of the access to electricity is negative (Informal institutional void 
is negative and significant at p<.01 in models 1-3). The GLOBE indicator that measures institutional 
collectivism captures the capability of societies to enact collective action practices. Indeed, high 
institutional individualism increases both the costs of monitoring the actions of each other, and the 
probability of free riding (Ostrom, 2000). This suggests that societies in which community members are 
able to cooperate are more likely to enable electricity cooperatives and NGOs that are effective in the 
provision of electricity. On the other hand, the degree of interpersonal trust is not found to be sufficient 
for fostering the creation of alternative solutions for the provision of electricity to local population 
(Informal institutional void is never significant in models 4-6). However, trust is typically limited to 
kinship networks in many developing countries (Ostrom et al. 1993, p. 63), and single family and ethnic 
groups may not have the necessary technical and business capabilities to create and manage non-profit 
electricity providers. Once controlling for the degree of individualism, formal institutions are unlikely to 
play a significant role by themselves (Formal institutional void is not significant in models 1-3), while 
on the contrary once controlling for trust, the strength of formal institutions appear to drive electricity 
provision (as Formal institutional void is negative and significant at p<.01 in models 4-6).   As far as FDI 
per capita, it does not seem to affect our dependent variable in Model (1), but interestingly it becomes 
positive and statistically significant (at p<.10) when interacted with formal institutional void (in model 
2) and with informal institutional void (in model 3).  
However, it is worth observing that in order to better gauge the moderating role of the formal and 
informal institutional voids of a host country, it is necessary to calculate the marginal effects. Therefore, 
                                                          










| = 𝛽1 +  𝛽4(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑠 𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 𝛽5(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖)𝑚𝑎𝑥 
 
The baseline is a scenario where both types of institutions are working well. Coherently the overall 
moderating role of the two types of institutional void is simply the sum of the two individual moderating 
roles, because the model does not cross the variables for formal and informal institutional voids. The 
estimates of marginal effects are reported in Table 8, and they show that FDI stimulates the growth of 
the access to electricity of  a local population when the host countries suffer from a double institutional 
void, i.e. when both formal and informal institutions are weak (the magnitude of the marginal effect is 
0.02, and it is significant at p<0.05, for both the dimensions considered for informal institutions). This 
confirms our first hypothesis. In principle, MNEs’ involvement could be driven by the presence of 
international sponsors such as development banks that mitigate the risk of private infrastructure projects 
in the region. Nonetheless, we tend to exclude that international development agencies play a major role 
in our results. In fact the relationship between FDI and access to electricity is moderated negatively by 
well-functioning formal institutions. By contrast, the typical contractual arrangements used by 
governments and development agencies to support the participation of private players in infrastructure 
investment require political, regulatory and judiciary protections (Moszoro et al., 2014).     
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Similarly, marginal effects are needed in order to interpret the findings obtained for the role of formal 
and informal institutional proximity, and their interactions with FDI per capita (Models 2-3, and Models 





𝛽1 +  𝛽4(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑠 𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑚𝑎𝑥 +  𝛽5(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑖)𝑚𝑎𝑥  +  𝛽6(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑚𝑎𝑥 
 
The results, reported in Table 8, show that FDI in host countries affected by both formal and informal 
institutional voids increase the access to electricity only if it comes from countries that present some 
degree of proximity with the host country, in terms of both formal institutions (the marginal effect is 




collectivism/individualism, and 0.04, significant at p<.05, when informal institutions are proxied by the 
degree of trust), and informal institutions (the marginal effect is 0.02, significant at p<.05, and 70.95, 
significant at p<.05, respectively). This confirms our second hypothesis. However, it may be also worth 
noting that, comparing the magnitude of marginal effects, it does appear that informal institutional 
proximity measured by trust is more important than proximity measured by similarity in terms of 
institutional collectivism. 
 
Finally, in order to test the goodness of our results, we re-ran our models adopting alternative measures 
of the quality of informal institutions, namely Hofstede’s individualism versus collectivism (Hofstede et 
al., 2010).13 This variable takes a high value when the society is considered individualist, which means 
that individuals are expected to only take care of themselves and their immediate families; conversely, 
the variable takes a low value when the society is collectivist, which means that individuals can expect 
their relatives or members of a particular group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.  
The estimates and computed marginal effects are shown in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. The results are 
in line with those obtained with the other two dimensions of institutional voids, especially with the degree 
of institutional collectivism sourced from the GLOBE project. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper adds to the literature on the impact of FDI and MNEs on the host country development by 
focusing on a specific dimension of development, i.e. the access to electricity. Specifically, adopting 
institutional theory lens (North, 1990; Ostrom, 2000), we argue that as low rates of access to electricity 
stems mainly from the weakness of institutions, both formal and informal institutions should be taken 
into consideration. Within this context, we show that in a context of formal and informal institutional 
void, FDI can contribute to increase the access to electricity of the host country. In doing so, we consider 
the institutional framework of both the host and the home country, in accordance with the literature on 
the competitive advantage of foreign MNEs in developing countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008; 
Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  
                                                          
13 As far as formal institutions are concerned, we rely on D’Amelio et al. (2016) where several checks have been conducted 




Our empirical analysis refers to SSA, and our findings, obtained with panel data techniques, reveal that 
FDI in countries affected by a double institutional void can effectively raise the access to electricity of 
the local populations. However, this happens when FDI come from countries that are institutionally 
closer to the host country (in both the formal and informal institutional environments). In particular, 
taking into account different dimensions of informal institutions, it emerges that FDI and the related 
MNEs coming from countries where the level of trust between individuals is low are particularly able to 
deal with the informal institutional void in the host country, thus having a greater impact on the 
electrification of the host country.  
We believe these results provide some answers to stimuli put forward by Buckley and Boddewyn (2015) 
on the need of investigating how home institutional experience may be conducive to the positive 
assumption of societal functions abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008).  
The paper also introduces important policy and managerial implications. As far as the former, our results 
suggest that FDI attraction polices should take into account both formal and informal institutional 
proximity between the host and the home country of the MNE. Indeed, these conditions seem to foster 
the energy development of host countries (thus paving the way to the long-term and inclusive 
development of the country). Our empirical evidence confirms previous claims about the role that MNEs 
can play in taking care of both market failures and institutional voids (a situation not uncommon in 
underdeveloped countries, where key economic, political, social and cultural institutions are either 
missing or defective), thus becoming economic and political actors that contribute to both private and 
public interests (Scherer et al., 2014). In fact, MNEs earn rents not only when markets do not function 
properly; they can also generate revenues when they assume the functions of missing or inefficient non-
market institutions (Henisz, Doronbatu and Nartey, 2004; Buckley and Boddewyn, 2015. 
Likewise, as far as managerial implications are concerned, those MNEs that are looking for legitimacy 
in developing countries should be aware of the role of institutional proximity when undertaking 
partnerships with local governments and/or local cooperatives and NGOs. In fact, in a recent paper on 
foreign MNEs during the pro-market reform of Uganda’s electricity generation sector (Mbalyohere and 
Lawton, 2018) one of the most important determinants of MNE success in Africa is not only the in-depth 
comprehension of the political and socio-economic transformation, but also the capability to accurately 
predict the trends associated with these transformations. These capabilities had been developed especially 
by MNEs that were historically conversant with the African continent, but also by MNEs originating 




Our results also suggest to MNEs’ managers what are those dimensions of informal institutions (e.g. 
trust) that might be more effective to gain legitimacy in a foreign country, in order to succeed in aligning 
their business considerations and their social engagement with societal benefits (Nachum, 2017). 
As usual, the work is not immune from limitations that, however, could pave the way for future research. 
First of all, our econometric analysis has allowed us to assess the significance of the relationship between 
FDI, access to electricity, institutional voids, and institutional proximity. However, a qualitative in depth 
analysis would be needed to understand how the effects of institutions occur, i.e. to reveal the 
mechanisms, and the organizational and social processes through which MNEs and FDI improve access 
to electricity for the local population.  
Second, although the results of our empirical analysis appear quite robust across several specifications, 
we had to deal with missing data through multiple imputation techniques in order to make the sample 
statistically acceptable, and with a measure of the presence of MNEs based on private investment, 
therefore underrepresenting State-owned enterprises and other governmental investors. This limits the 
possibility of generalizing our results to Chinese FDI in Africa that has insofar followed a model financial 
engagement mainly based on loans rather than investments14.  
Overall, we believe that our conclusions are important, not only because we emphasize the role of 
informal institutions and the related informal institutionally proximity as moderating factors in the 
relationship between FDI and local development, but also in terms of their impact on  research that 
focuses  on emerging markets and under-researched “frontier markets”, like those in Sub-Saharan Africa 
that may help shedding further light on the role of context in IB. In fact, we are only beginning to 
understand the contributions that studies of the African continent can bring to general management and 
IB research on the impact of business on society (Kolk and Rivera-Santos, 2018). 
We discuss how FDI may foster access to energy in a local context, as a result of both market and non-
market strategies. However, MNEs currently invest in developing countries for different reasons, from 
purely resource-seeking reasons to knowledge-seeking reasons, especially in search of bottom-of-the-
pyramid innovations (Chikhouni et al., 2017). These emerging motivations for internationalization may 
                                                          
14 However, there are recent signals of a change in the model of financial engagement in Africa. Evolving away from the 
previous model, China has been increasingly keen on utilizing financing provided by Chinese development finance 
institutions, such as China Development Bank and China-Africa Development Fund, to support Chinese companies’ equity 
investment in Africa. Nonetheless, and despite all the enthusiasm about China investing more in Africa, the actual volume of 
Chinese investment in African remains small, both in absolute terms and in comparison with other regions. In 2017, China’s 
foreign direct investment toward Africa was $3.1 billion, 2.5 percent of China’s global foreign direct investment that year, 





lead to a different balance between market and non-market strategies, and to a different involvement 
(and, consequently, impact) of MNEs within the local context. Additionally, investigating the impact of 
FDI on the provision of other collective and public goods (e.g. healthcare, education, and infrastructure) 
in developing countries could strengthen the generalizability of our results. 
We believe that future research opportunities exist to investigate the role of MNEs in fostering local 
development, by adopting a firm-level analysis. In fact, while the novelty of the paper is that it integrates 
the study of the impact of FDI on the access to energy institutional distance, with the formal and informal 
institutions framework, we have adopted a country-level perspective.  The motivations of MNEs 
underlying the specific FDI initiative may lead to different types of partnerships with local communities 
and NGOs and, consequently, a multi-level analysis could provide further hints on that (as recently 
suggested also by Kolk et al., 2018).  
Finally, our results also add to the broader theme of the role of private sector investment in infrastructure 
and its pro-poor impacts (Shah and Batley, 2009) as we find that private sector participation has the 
potential to make the difference, contingent on a certain degree of institutional proximity between the 
home and the host country.  This is in line with the framework recently suggested in Kolk et al (2018) 
that highlight the positive causal relationship between FDI and poverty reduction as well as the 
importance of factors that moderate this relationship, particularly industry and country effects. Among 
the latter, our results on “the governance characteristics” of the host countries, as well as their affinities 
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Table 1. Options for electricity provision in developing countries under different combinations of 
formal and informal institutions, and distribution of the sample of Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
 
    Formal Institutions 




Electricity provided by governments (or 
regulated utilities), NGOs and electricity 
cooperatives through national grids, mini 
grids or off-grid systems   
Electricity provided by NGOs and electricity 
cooperatives) through off- or mini-grid 
systems   
Weak 
Electricity provided by the governments 
(or regulated utilities) through national or 
mini grids  
Electricity provided by MNEs through 
national grids or mini-grid systems   
     Sources: Authors’ analysis.  
Note: Our sample covers 15 Sub-Saharan Africa countries that distribute across the 4 table cells, i.e. 3, 4, 2 and 6 countries 
are placed respectively in the Strong Informal – Strong Formal, Strong Informal – Weak Formal, Weak Informal – Strong 






Table 2. Home and host country pairs in our dataset. 
Home countries Host countries 
Angola Israel Saudi Arabia South Africa 
Argentina Italy Seychelles Ghana 
Aruba Japan Singapore Mauritius 
Australia Kenya Slovenia Angola 
Austria Korea, Rep. South Africa Cameroon 
Bahamas, The Lebanon Spain Congo, Rep. 
Bahrain Liberia Sri Lanka Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Belgium Libya Swaziland Gabon 
Bermuda Liechtenstein Sweden Kenya 
Botswana Luxembourg Switzerland Uganda 
Brazil Madagascar Taiwan, China Eritrea 
Bulgaria Malawi Tanzania Ethiopia 
Canada Malaysia Thailand Botswana 
Cayman Islands Maldives Togo Namibia 
China Malta Turkey Nigeria 
Cote d'Ivoire Mauritius United Kingdom   
Cyprus Morocco United States   
Czech Republic Mozambique Uganda   
Denmark Namibia United Arab Emirates   
Finland Netherlands Uruguay   
France New Zealand Yemen, Rep.   
Germany Nigeria Zambia   
Ghana Norway Zimbabwe   
Greece Pakistan     
Hong Kong SAR, China Panama     
Hungary Paraguay     
Iceland Philippines     
India Poland     
Indonesia Portugal     
Ireland Russian Federation     
Source: Sample data from UNCTAD FDI Statistics Division on Investment and Enterprise 









Table 3. Access to electricity rate in Sub-Saharan African host countries, 2005 and 2011. 
  
  2005 2011 
(Households) access to electricity  
(%) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 53 67 
Angola 15 38 
Botswana 39 46 
Cameroon 47 54 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6 9 
Congo, Rep. 20 37 
Eritrea 20 32 
Ethiopia 15 23 
Gabon 48 60 
Ghana 49 72 
Kenya 14 19 
Mauritius 94 99 
Namibia 34 60 
Nigeria 46 48 
South Africa 70 85 
Uganda 9 15 
Source: Sample data from International Energy Agency (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyaccessdatabase/) 






Table 4. Distribution of FDI per capita by region of origin. 
 
  
FDI per capita 
(US dollar) 
% 
Regions of Origin 
China (w/ Hong Kong) 18,684 6.60 
East Asia (w/o China &  Hong Kong) 4,222 1.50 
European Union 80,385 28.60 
India 7,916 2.80 
Latin America & Caribbean 20,713 7.40 
North Africa & Middle East 6,541 2.30 
North America 55,250 19.60 
Oceania 12,014 4.30 
Russia 153 0.10 
South East Asia 42,543 15.10 
South Asia (w/o India) 1,921 0.70 
Sub-Saharan Africa 30,923 11.00 
Total 281,264   
Source: Sample data from UNCTAD FDI Statistics Division on Investment and Enterprise 








Table 5. Formal institutional voids: loadings from the factor analysis 
 
World Bank Governance 
Indicators 
Institutional quality host Institutional quality home 
Political stability 0.8230 0.9449 
Rule of law 0.9615 0.9554 
Voice and Accountability 0.9467 0.9502 
Control of Corruption 0.9338 0.8468 
Governance Effectiveness 0.9644 0.9628 
Regulatory Quality 0.9357 0.8520 
Cumulative proportion of WGIs 
variance explained by the factor 
 
86.26% 84.64% 







Table 6. Sample variables: descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (N=1 547). 
  
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Access to electricity 58.91 28.07 5.80 99.00 1 
                
(2) Population 29.21 24.55 1.20 160.00 -0.12* 1 
               
(3) Rural population 50.72 16.46 13.85 86.75 -0.42* 0.02 1 
              
(4) Population density 170.76 205.00 2.46 633.52 0.62* -0.47* 0.17* 1 
             
(5) Industry value added 32.79 13.74 10.39 77.41 -0.16* -0.27* -0.49* -0.28* 1 
            
(6) Services value added 55.23 14.12 18.91 70.94 0.63* 0.12* -0.02 0.40* -0.60* 1 
           
(7) LIC 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 -0.59* 0.21* 0.65* -0.17* -0.42* -0.29* 1 
          
(8) LMIC 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 -0.22* -0.22* -0.11* -0.19* 0.50* -0.54* -0.24* 1 
         
(9) FDI per capita 181.81 1496.38 0.04 39379.23 0.11* -0.12* 0.02 0.17* -0.02 0.07* -0.07* -0.01 1 
        
(10) Formal institutional voids 1.27 1.00 0.00 3.76 -0.78* 0.19* 0.26* -0.57* 0.34* -0.76* 0.46* 0.44* -0.10* 1 
       
(11) Informal institutional voids  
(Hofstede) 
38.67 21.12 15.00 65.00 0.34* 0.39* -0.45* -0.26* -0.03 0.56* -0.52* -0.35* -0.05* -0.51* 1 
      
(12) Informal institutional voids 
(individualism) 
0.53 0.30 0.00 0.85 0.15* 0.26* -0.57* -0.44* 0.38* 0.20* -0.67* 0.05* -0.05* -0.11* 0.79* 1 
     
(13) Informal institutional voids  
(distrust) 
1200.54 1087.68 0.00 2529.00 -0.17* -0.34* 0.62* 0.45* -0.27* -0.20* 0.56* 0.03 0.07* 0.24* -0.83* -0.83* 1 
    
(14) Formal institutional proximity 6.57 1.47 0.00 8.57 0.21* 0.11* -0.13* -0.03 -0.21* 0.23* -0.05* -0.17* -0.02 -0.32* 0.23* 0.05* -0.15* 1 
   
(15) Informal institutional proximity 
(Hofstede) 
2.75 0.92 0.00 4.45 -0.04* -0.19* 0.30* 0.24* -0.04 -0.03 0.07* 0.06* 0.02 0.07* -0.31* -0.24* 0.35* -0.03 1 
  
(16) Informal institutional proximity 
(individualism) 
4.88 1.36 0.00 6.71 -0.12* -0.22* 0.09* -0.02 0.21* -0.03 -0.21* 0.10* 0.07* 0.11* 0.01 0.21* 0.07* -0.28* 0.11* 1 
 
(17) Informal institutional proximity 
(distrust) 
8.47 2.00 0.00 9.96 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.06* 0.01 -0.12* 0.06* 0.06* -0.03 0.10* -0.16* -0.11* 0.15* -0.11* -0.13* -0.09* 1 




Table 7. System GMM Estimates. 
  Informal Institutional Void: Degree of Individualism Informal Institutional Void: Degree of Distrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
















Access to electricity t-1 -0.70*** -0.65*** -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.65*** -0.73*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Population t-1 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Rural population t-1 -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.25*** -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.55*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Population density t-1 0.04*** 0.033*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry value added t-1 -0.14 -0.14 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Services value added t-1 0.34*** 0.22** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.54*** 
  (0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
LMIC -4.45* -4.1 -8.13*** 5.62*** 5.64*** 7.80*** 
  (2.61) (2.53) (2.59) (1.62) (1.64) (1.88) 
LIC  -24.55*** -21.32*** -27.89*** - - - 
  (4.37) (4.09) (4.08)       
FDI per capita t-1 -0.02** -0.03 0.04 -0.004 -0.05 -0.003 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.004) (0.04) (0.004) 
Formal institutional void t-1 0.08 -1.34 1.01 -3.50*** -3.96*** -2.92** 
  (1.33) (1.15) (1.51) (1.18) (1.26) (1.27) 
Informal institutional void -20.22*** -16.90*** -16.67*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  (5.61) (5.02) (5.37) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Formal institutional void t-1 0.003 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Informal institutional void  0.02** -0.02 -0.01 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Formal institutional proximity t-1 - -0.02 - - -0.09 - 
    (0.4)     (0.4)   
FDI per capita t-1 * Formal institutional proximity t-1 - 0.01 - - 0.01 - 
    (0.01)     (0.01)   
Informal institutional proximity - - -3.58*** - - 0.04 
      (0.96)   - (0.23) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Informal institutional proximity - - -0.01 - - 0.001** 
      (0.01)     (0.001) 
Constant 56.02*** 55.72*** 61.58*** 37.76*** 38.34*** 30.34*** 
  (9.33) (10.14) (8.75) (7.88) (8.77) (8.74) 
Observations 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,326 1,105 
Number of pair countries 221 221 221 221 221 221 
AR(1) -5.64 -5.58 -5.72 -5.51 -5.57 -5.012 
AR(2) 0.63 1.1 0.63 1.2 1.23 0.46 
Wald test 220.39 220.71 216.59 221 220.91 218.81 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Notes: Dependent variable ∆Access to electricity. Two-step system-GMM. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  All AR(1) test statistics statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. All AR(2) test statistics 




Table 8. Access to electricity growth: Marginal effects of FDI per capita. 
    
Informal Institutional 
Voids: Degree of 
Individualism 
Informal Institutional Voids: 
Degree of Distrust 




Host Formal and Informal 
Institutional Voids 
(H2) 
Formal Institutional Proximity 
0.02* 0.04** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
Formal Institutional Distance 
-0.02 -0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Host Formal and Informal 
Institutional Voids 
(H2) 
Informal Institutional Proximity 
0.02** 70.95** 
(0.01) (32.08) 
Informal Institutional Distance 
0.07 0.01 
(0.04) (0.01) 
Two-step system GMM. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 







Table 9. Alternative measure of quality of informal institutions: System GMM Estimates 
  
(1) (2) (3) 









Access to electricity t-1 -0.71*** -0.79*** -0.71***  
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Population t-1 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.17***  
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Rural population t-1 -0.39*** -0.45*** -0.39***  
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Population density t-1 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry value added t-1 -0.22** -0.04 -0.22**  
(0.11) (0.13) (0.10) 
Services value added t-1 0.18* 0.45*** 0.17*  
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10) 
LMIC -3.89 -2.14 -3.84  
(2.46) (3.08) (2.42) 
LIC -18.27*** -16.96*** -18.08***  
(3.51) (4.15) (3.49) 
FDI per capita t-1 -0.01 -0.02 0.001  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Formal institutional voids t-1 -4.24*** -4.37*** -4.16***  
(1.45) (1.64) (1.44) 
Informal institutional void -0.20** -0.27*** 0.19**  
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Formal institutional void t-1 0.01** 0.01* 0.01*  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Informal institutional void 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 














Informal institutional proximity 
  
-0.30    
(0.55) 
FDI per capita t-1 * Informal institutional proximity 
  
-0.002    
(0.002) 
Constant 65.33*** 53.60*** 69.70***  
(9.92) (11.85) (9.70) 
Observations 1,326 1,105 1,326 
Number of pair countries 221 221 221 
AR(1) -5.42 -4.85 -5.41 
AR(2) 1.02 0.09 1.04 
Wald test 220.90 219.85 220.87 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Notes: Dependent variable ∆Access to electricity. Two-step system-GMM. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
           All AR(1) test statistics statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. All AR(2) test statistics statistically insignificant.  
           All Hansen test statistics statistically insignificant. 









Formal and Informal 
Institutional Void 









0.02** 0.03** 0.02 0.02* 0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Two-step system GMM. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  





















Quality of public and civil services and the degree 
of their independence from political pressures. 
Quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. 
 
Government's ability in 
directly providing electricity; 
Credibility of regulatory 
system. 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence and 
Terrorism 
  
Likelihood of political instability and/or politically 
motivated violence, including terrorism. 
 
Political stability. 
Voice and Accountability  Extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
a free media. 
 
Administrative capabilities of 
the country; Judicial 
independence and 
professionalism.   
 
Regulatory Quality Ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
 
Credibility of regulatory 
system. 
Control of Corruption Extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
 





Rule of Law Extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence.  
Administrative capabilities of 
the country; Judicial 
independence and 
professionalism. 
Sources:  A Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)     
                   accessed on 13rd July 2015. 
                B Bergara et al., 1998. 
  
 
 
